In Which I Savagely Impugn the Honor of IPMI & its Friends

IPMI+ Security Paper

A paper on IPMI and BMC security:

IPMI: Freight Train to Hell, plain HTML or dangerous PDF (bloated director's cut; HTML was generated from word and edited down.)

- or -

IPMI: Express Train to Hell, in HTML or PDF (1 page, G-rated version.)

The 2nd link is the express/single page/reader's digest version, which has various generalities that I try to fully explain in the paper or supporting documents. Added bonus: if you buy now you'll get free additional supporting materials along with a razor sharp virtual Ginsu knife!

Note - I've heard a LOT of people dismiss all this and claim that all you need to do is to secure your IPMI/BMC's is to ensure that their network interfaces are on their own network and be careful about that critical password. This is simply incorrect. If you haven't read the paper or heard the arguments within you might read it to find out why I belive you're dead wrong (and if you still disagree drop me a line and tell me!) Note that any with server admin access can manage the IPMI network settings of its BMC without authentiation, attack the BMC, compromise it, and then pivot through to attack the management network.

Note #2. As if all the above weren't enough, I just found out that the infamous Cipher Zero (0) is enabled by default on all my systems... this allows anyone to authenticate to the BMC with any password you choose (even you manage to guess the correct one, that still works.) fascinating stuff.

Note #3. You want into your iDRAC's BMC? A small writeup on how you can do this, at least on some BMCs.

  1. Feedback
    1. Agree or no, feel free to drop me a line: zen @ either fish2.com or trouble.org.
    2. If you've done development/guts work with IPMI/BMCs and would care to chat, let me know!
  2. Q's, FAQs, WTFs
    1. IPMI Security Best Practices
    2. IPMI IFAQ (Infrequently (or never)) Asked Questions
  3. Tech Notes/Addendums
    1. IPMI protocol notes (coming ASAP)
    2. BMC notes (coming ASAP)
    3. A few methods to extract or capture an IPMI password
    4. Notes on breaking into/after IPMI stuff (work in progress)
  4. Misc paper additions
    1. Bibliography
    2. Test lab
  5. Very small bits of ipmi related software by me
    1. Tools and tidbits

Server Vendors

A very small assortment of server vendors, at least to provide some context; if you haven't heard of their version of IPMI, you've at least heard of them, assuming you're reading this on a computer. Most seem to simply give out the images, which contain the BMC's operating system and basic boot environment, but a few require a service contract or relationship with the vendor (which I didn't have.) I had access to the first 3 here, and some sketchy notes to the first 4; clicking the vendor icon to see more.

Vendor IPMI Flavor Latest Version BMC Flash Images
DelliDRAC (Integrated Dell Remote Access Card) iDRAC 7Anyone may download
Hewlett Packard iLO (Integrated Lights Out) iLO 4Anyone
Supermicro Supermicro Intelligent Management ? (IPMI 2.0) Anyone
LenovoIMM? IMM (legacy IBM?)Anyone
IBM IMM (Integrated Management Module) IMM2Requires service contract
Fujitsu iRMC (Integrated Remote Management Controller) iRMC S3Anyone
Oracle/Sun ILOM (Integrated Lights Out Manager) ILOM 3Requires service contract

Source for the S5520 Server Platforms - a dozen BMCs on various Intel boards - kudos to Intel! (Presumably they have others out there, I was sent this link.) http://downloadcenter.intel.com/Detail_Desc.aspx?DwnldID=17649

Firmware Vendors

Firmware Vendors - under the hood more vendors lurk; there are only a few places that make BMCs, or Baseboard Mgmt Controllers, the little computers that implement IPMI; it's often created by 3 or more different vendors - the chipmakers, the firmware software adder-onners, and a big vendor like IBM, Dell, HP, etc., which all have their own names for their flavor of IPMI. I've put up some notes on some of my findings when or if applicable. It's interesting to note the ubiquity of China in all of these.

Vendor Manufactured in...
Nuvoton Hong Kong and Shenzhen
Emulex ... at least some presence in Beijing and Shanghai
ATEN HQ in Taiwan, factories in Shenzhen.
Winbond Housed in Taiwan, also in Kunshan city, China.
Avocent Beijing and Guangzhou
ASPEED HQ'd in Taiwan, factories/subsidiary in China
Renesas Mainland China and Hong Kong